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Summary and Tentative Conclusions 
This is a first cut at the question of potential liability for forecasting. It in-
cludes a brief look at the common-law background and the current securities 
law setting, an analysis of the few relevant cases to date, and a little fore-
casting of its own about possible future developments. 
As urged by the Study Group at an earlier meeting, the emphasis is 
upon the risks that management would run in publicly disseminating fore-
casts, especially if this were to become a regular feature of corporate report-
ing (whether as a result of pressure from the accounting profession or 
otherwise). The various possible roles of auditors in the forecasting process, 
and their corresponding exposure to liability, are left for another day. 
Further, in order to avoid intruding on the deliberations of the Study Group 
on the merits, the paper does not attempt to appraise the various pros and 
cons of forecasting apart from the legal issue, or to delineate the various 
approaches to forecasting, ranging from the item-by-item projections to 
one-line estimates of future net income. 
On principle it would appear that management would not be liable for a 
forecast merely because it turned out to be wide of the mark, if it were 
made in good faith and for a proper purpose, if it represented management's 
actual belief as to the future prospects, and were prepared with reasonable 
care and skill; the few cases to date support the conclusion. However, this 
optimistic prognosis must be tempered with the caveat that, if management 
forecasts became a regular feature of the reporting scene, at least in the short 
run there might well be a significant increase in the risk of being sued, as 
distinguished from the risk of liability, because forecasts that go awry will 
present a very inviting target to potential shareholder litigants. Hopefully, 
* This paper was submitted as a memorandum to the Study Group on the Objectives 
of Financial Statements on June 23, 1972. Its style remains unchanged for this print-
ing. See footnote 1, p. 248, which reflects SEC action on forecasting during 1973. 
247 
judicial pronouncements would soon make the game not worth the candle 
when nothing more than erroneous projection is involved. 
There is little reason to doubt that most managements could and would 
routinely meet the tests of good faith, proper purpose, and honest belief; 
but carelessness is a fact of life, and hence the real nub of this issue may 
be the extent of liability when there is a failure of due care in the preparation 
of the forecast. It is an open question whether, under general legal principles, 
negligence in the preparation of a forecast otherwise made in good faith in 
the normal course of management's reporting function should or would give 
rise to liability to the entire universe of existing shareholders and prospective 
investors for losses allegedly resulting therefrom. This question is equally 
unsettled under the securities law provisions, like Rule 10b-5, which are 
addressed in general terms to fraud or deception and accordingly would 
seem to require something akin to intentional or at least knowing misrepre-
sentation, rather than mere negligence, at least in a civil action for damages 
rather than a suit for rescission or an SEC injunction action. Resolution of 
this question will have to await further clarification by the courts. Section 11 
of the Securities Act, dealing with registration of stock for sale to the public, 
stands on a special footing since the statute appears to expressly require 
due care and to lay particular onus on anyone cast in the role of an expert, 
as might be true in the case of a forecast if it were prepared or "certified" by 
an analyst or, perhaps, an accountant; but, at the moment, the SEC does not 
permit forecasts or projections in a prospectus under Section 11 anyway.1 
Common-Law Background 
The law relating to liability for providing inaccurate or insufficient 
information in the securities field has, of course, been largely taken over by 
the federal securities legislation. Nevertheless, in seeking to appraise the 
risks of liability associated with a relatively new phenomenon like forecasting, 
a quick look at the applicable common-law principles is a good starting point. 
Under the common law of torts, a distinction has always been drawn 
between statements of opinion and statements of objective fact, so far as 
liability for error is concerned. The basis for this distinction is that in the 
1 Since the date when this paper was prepared, the SEC has revised its policy 
on forecasts, with the promulgation, after extensive public hearings, of Sec. Exch. 
Act Rel. No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973). Under this Release, the Commission would allow, 
though not require, issuers who are reporting companies and who meet certain 
standards relating to earnings and budgeting experience to include projections in 
various fil ings with the Commission. The Release also announces that the Commis-
sion will promulgate rules relating to the liability provisions of the securities laws, 
to define the circumstances under which a projection would not be considered to 
be a misleading statement of a material fact. In this connection, the Release con-
tains the fol lowing observations (which seem to be in accord with the main thrust of 
this paper): " I t is contemplated that [the new rules] would embody the concept that 
a projection is not a promise that it will be achieved nor per se misleading if not 
achieved. A projection would not be considered to be a misstatement of a material 
fact if it were reasonably based in fact, prepared with reasonable care and carefully 
reviewed." 
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classic "one on one" bargaining situation that the common law normally 
contemplated, a reasonable person would not, or at least should not, rely 
upon the opinion of his adversary since such an opinion could be expected 
to be self-serving, and even exaggerated, within fairly wide limits. This view 
is embodied in the so-called "puffing" doctrine, under which a seller is 
allowed broad latitude to commend his own wares in an effort to persuade 
another to buy. 
However, most of the recent authorities, particularly in the securities 
field, have tended toward narrowing the permissible scope of opinions. For 
one thing, the courts have become quicker to parse statements of inter-
mingled fact and opinion to find one or more misrepresentations of fact. In 
addition, there has been greater recognition that even a pure statement of 
opinion involves at least one implied representation of fact, that is, that the 
speaker actually holds the opinion expressed. Between two parties with fully 
equal bargaining power, this may be an immaterial fact, with no liability for 
misrepresentation of it. But where one party has greater knowledge or 
expertise than the other (as is commonly true in securities transactions), 
reliance may be justifiable; in such cases the implied representation that the 
opinion is honestly entertained may also carry with it the implied assertion 
that there is some reasonable basis in fact for the view expressed. Courts 
have become more willing to find justifiable reliance on these implied 
representations of fact embodied in an expression of opinion, especially 
where the complaining party only seeks rescission of the transaction to get 
back to where he started, rather than damages for deceit, which would 
normally entitle him to recover an amount measured by what the transaction 
would have been worth to him if it had been as described. 
Where do forecasts fit into this framework? While such a prediction as 
to future events does amount to merely a statement of opinion, a forecast 
may well include an implied representation that it represents the forecaster's 
honest belief about the future and that there is some reasonable factual basis 
for that belief, especially if the forecast is promulgated by the management 
(or anyone else with special access to information). Meeting this standard 
would presumably require at least that the forecast be based upon a reason-
able analysis of the available data, and perhaps also that it reflects the product 
of such professional competence as those who publicize it appear to possess. 
On the other hand, where a forecast (or other prediction) is made in 
good faith for proper purposes, actually represents the forecaster's best 
estimate, and is prepared with reasonable care, there should not be any 
common law liability merely because the results turn out to be quite different 
from those forecast. After all, one who makes a forecast does not thereby 
undertake to warrant the future; hence, there would be no breach of duty 
upon which liability could be predicated. 
There seems little reason to doubt that, in the main, managements could 
and would meet these standards of good faith, proper purpose, actual belief 
in the estimate, and reasonable care in preparing it. Nevertheless, the reason-
able care requirement must give us some pause, since experience teaches 
that "to err is human," and with any increase in activity comes an increase 
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in negligence, even with the best of will; hence, it would be foolhardy not 
to expect some careless projections, if forecasting becomes far more wide-
spread. Moreover, it is predictable that there would be a heavier concentra-
tion of alleged and actual carelessness during the early period of any 
transition to widespread forecasting, while managements are getting used 
to what for many will be a new activity (although perhaps this would be 
offset by the courts' adopting a somewhat lower standard of reasonable care 
at the outset, which could be raised as the state of the forecasting art 
develops). This ties in with the point made earlier, in the summary, that a 
considerable proliferation of lawsuits relating to forecasts must be expected 
when and if they become a regular feature of corporate reporting, just 
because they will present such an inviting target. The combination of these 
two factors suggests an inevitable and uncomfortable chorus of "I told you 
so," at least in the short run, from opponents of forecasts if their opposition 
is overridden, a point of some force though obviously not conclusive. 
In any event, on the merits it is not entirely clear to what extent there 
would be liability for a forecast which turned out to be erroneous because 
of carelessness in preparation. The question of liability for negligent but 
unintentional misrepresentation has been one of the most troublesome in 
the law of torts; and here we are not even dealing with a direct factual mis-
representation, but only a failure in the implied representation that a forecast 
is the product of reasonable care. The courts have long been wary of 
imposing liability for pecuniary loss from misrepresentations that are merely 
negligent because, unlike the case of physical injury, which is generally at 
least somewhat localized, misinformation may be so widely disseminated 
and circulated that the resulting losses could be virtually unlimited, thus 
creating the prospect of "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The result could be a 
crushing burden of liability, out of all proportion to the magnitude of the 
defendant's fault where he has done no more than fail to use reasonable care. 
The best-known cases of this kind are, of course, those (like Ultramares) 
involving the liability of accountants for negligence to parties other than the 
particular client for whom erroneous financial statements were prepared or 
certified. Of late there has been a marked tendency away from the so-called 
"privity" doctrine, under which an accountant's liability for negligence 
(apart from securities law provisions) was pretty much confined to his client 
or other person with or for whom he had specifically dealt, and in the direction 
of making the accountant liable at least to "limited classes of persons" whose 
likely reliance on the statements involved could be readily foreseen. See 
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (holding an 
accountant liable to a prospective lender who had been specifically identified 
as one to whom the statements would be shown). The latest version of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second) has taken the lead in this development, with 
the following provision in section 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966): 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or em-
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ployment, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their busi-
ness transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to 
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or com-
municating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in 
subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one 
of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply 
the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; 
and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends 
the information to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, 
or in a substantially similar transaction. 
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the 
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons 
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in 
which it is intended to protect them. 
Though its primary role to date has been to help extend the liability of 
accountants, Restatement section 552 is certainly not confined to such cases 
but applies to negligent misrepresentations by anyone. Hence negligent mis-
representations by corporate officers, in the course of forecasting or other-
wise, would fall within its ambit; and, of course, forecasting is an excellent 
example of a situation where the defendants could face liability to untold 
numbers of investors for untold amounts of market losses allegedly resulting 
from a careless mistake in the forecast. Since it is quite likely that, just as 
they have recently in the case of accountants' liability, the common-law courts 
would look to this Restatement provision for guidance in setting limits on the 
liability of management for negligent forecasts, we should do the same; but 
unfortunately section 552 provides no ready answer. One of the Reporter's 
comments to section 552 makes it clear that the beginning phrase is not 
intended to confine the section to statements made in the course of a pro-
fessional engagement: "Thus the officers of a corporation, although they 
receive no personal consideration for giving information concerning its affairs, 
may have a pecuniary interest in its transactions since they stand to profit 
indirectly from them." Moreover, the words "the persons for whose benefit 
and guidance he intends to supply the information" in paragraph 2 (a) of the 
section certainly could encompass the entire investing public in the case of 
a forecast disseminated by management for the general information of the 
investing community. On the other hand, it seems clear that section 552 is 
intended to confine the scope of potential liability to something less than all 
of those who might foreseeably rely upon the statements made. Precisely the 
same question arises, of course, with regard to accountants: Will they be 
liable for negligence under section 552 to all of the stockholders of the com-
pany (and perhaps also prospective investors) on the ground that they are 
the primary intended beneficiaries of the accountant's engagement? On this 
question we do not have any judicial intimations as yet, but some light is 
251 
shed by the Reporter's illustrative examples under section 552, which seem 
to indicate an intention to confine liability to a more limited class of persons: 
Illustrations 
* * * * * 
2. A is negotiating with the X Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank 
requires an audit by certified public accountants. A employs B & Company, 
a firm of accountants, to make the audit, telling them that it is to meet the 
requirements of the X Bank. B & Company agree to make the audit, with the 
express understanding that it is for transmission to X Bank only. The X Bank 
fails, and A without any further communication with B & Company submits 
their certification to the Y Bank, which in reliance upon it extends a credit of 
$50,000 to A. The audit is so carelessly made as to greatly overstate the 
financial resources of A, and in consequence the Y Bank suffers pecuniary 
loss through its extension of credit. B & Company is not liable to Y Bank. 
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that nothing is said about 
supplying the information for the guidance of X Bank only, and A merely 
informs B that he expects to negotiate a bank loan, and has the X Bank in 
mind. B & Company is subject to liability to Y Bank. 
4. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that A informs B that he 
expects to negotiate a bank loan, but does not mention the name of any 
bank. B & Company is subject to liability to Y Bank. 
* * * * * 
7. A, a certified public accountant, is employed by B Company to pre-
pare and certify a balance sheet for the corporation. A is not informed of 
any intended use of the balance sheet, but A knows that such certificates are 
customarily used in a wide variety of financial transactions with the corpo-
ration, and that it may be relied upon by lenders, investors, shareholders, 
creditors, purchasers, and the like, in numerous possible kinds of trans-
actions. In fact B Company uses the certified balance sheet to obtain a loan 
from X Bank. Because of A's negligence the balance sheet presents an in-
accurate picture of the finances of B Company, and through reliance upon it 
X Bank suffers pecuniary loss. A is not liable to X Bank. 
It would seem that the limitation implied in these examples should be 
equally applicable in the case of management forecasting (and maybe even 
more applicable, since forecasting would constitute only a minor aspect of 
management's activities, rather than the primary product of a professional 
engagement for a fee, as in the accountant's case). However, an eye must 
be kept on paragraph 3 of section 552, since management forecasting might 
arguably become a "public duty" if it came to be required, for example, by 
the SEC. 
Thus, the most that can be said about liability for negligent forecasts at 
the moment is that the matter is very much in flux, as part of the general 
uncertainty relating to negligent misstatements. It should also be kept in mind 
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that even if there are limitations on liability operative in the case of "mere" 
negligence, they may be lost in the event of gross carelessness, such as a 
substantial failure to do the spadework necessary to form a meaningful 
opinion, which could be characterized as constructive fraud rather than 
simply negligence. See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 
15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938). For the sake of completeness, it might be added that 
there could, of course, be difficult questions in attempting to measure the 
amount of loss "caused" by a negligent forecast, as, for example, where a 
carelessly over-optimistic forecast is followed by sharp drop in stock prices 
in conjunction with an overall market slump. But causation represents a story 
all its own, which we need not pause to consider since forecasting would not 
appear to present any special problem in this area. 
The Impact of the Securities Laws 
Of course, suits concerning forecasts, like everything else in the securi-
ties field these days, will in fact be lodged not under the common law but 
rather under one or more provisions of the federal securities laws. There is 
no need for a detailed catalogue of these various provisions at this point; 
suffice it to note that except for Section 11 of the Securities Act, which affirma-
tively requires accurate information in connection with registration of securi-
ties for sale to the public, subject to a defense of reasonable care for every-
one but the issuer, all of the securities law provisions amount to some variant 
of a prohibition against fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The prime example 
is the famous (or infamous) SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Commission 
pursuant to § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits 
the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contra-
vention of rules prescribed by the SEC. For convenient reference, here is the 
relevant language of Rule 10b-5, making it unlawful, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security: 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Where do forecasts and other predictions stand under such securities 
law provisions? The starting point, at least, is the same as under the common-
law analysis above. Most of the cases in point, to date, have involved over-
optimistic predictions by securities salesmen as to the likely future price of a 
stock (not infrequently interspersed with observations about likely future 
sales, net income, and the like); and while the courts have recognized the 
distinction between "mere predictions and opinions" and representations of 
fact, they have been quick to find a knowing factual misrepresentation when 
there was no reasonable basis for the opinion expressed, e.g., SEC v. F. S. 
Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566 (D.C.N.J. 1962) ("Nor may refuge be sought in 
the argument that representations made to induce a sale of stock dealt merely 
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with forecasts of future events relating to projected earnings and the value 
of the securities, except to the extent that there is a rational basis from exist-
ing facts upon which such forecast can be made, and a fair disclosure of the 
material facts."); SEC v. Broadwell Securities, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965) ("Mere predictions and opinions" unlawful under Rule 10b-5 where 
"the salesmen knew, or should have known, that there was no basis in fact 
for such optimistic representations."); Irwin v. United States, 338 F2d 770 
(9th Cir. 1964) (Even if forecasts of future profits were merely opinion, 
"implicit in any such expression of opinion . . . is the representation of fact 
that such opinion is honestly entertained," which requires a showing of some 
basis in fact.). The emphasis on a "reasonable basis in fact" which recurs in 
the foregoing cases is merely a variant on one of the common-law themes 
referred to above; and, of course, such a standard should not pose any 
threat to a management properly doing its job in the forecasting area. 
What about liability for negligent misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5? 
The answer is as uncertain here as under the common law, although for 
somewhat different reasons. Because the roots of Rule 10b-5 lie in a statu-
tory prohibition against fraud and deception, concepts which have always 
imported the element of intentional, or at least knowing, misrepresentation 
(or perhaps reckless disregard of whether the statement is true or false)— 
the so-called "scienter" requirement—there is much force in the contention 
that negligence alone cannot constitute a violation of the Rule. The majority 
of the judicial comments on the Rule are consistent with this view, so far as 
private suits for damages are concerned, although it appears to be generally 
agreed that negligent conduct may be enjoined. On the other hand, many of 
the commentators have favored a right of action for negligence, subject to 
varying limitations, and there are few decisions which hold or assume that 
negligent misrepresentations are actionable under the Rule, e.g., Drake v. 
Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. III. 1967). (Allegations of errone-
ous financial statements against a company and its accountants by an open-
market purchaser of stock can "be sustained as either an intentional mis-
representation or as a negligent misrepresentation.") 
As to the old common-law requirement of privity, and the current version 
of that limitation embodied in Restatement Section 552, there has been little 
discussion in the Rule 10b-5 cases involving negligence. To be sure, the 
Drake case, cited above, does state expressly that "notions of privity cannot 
apply" in actions under Rule 10b-5, because that would impede the objec-
tive of the Rule to protect investors and the public interest, and a number of 
the commentators reach the same conclusion. Unfortunately, however, the 
Drake court relies primarily on cases involving alleged intentional or knowing 
misrepresentation, where there has always been a good deal less disposi-
tion to limit a defendant's liability. In any event, there is certainly no basis 
for optimism that, if there is liability for negligence under Rule 10b-5 at all, 
it will be limited in a manner akin to Restatement Section 552 or otherwise. 
As noted in connection with the common-law analysis, there will be 
troublesome questions of causation in connection with liability for forecast-
ing, and that is no less true under Rule 10b-5. While this question need not 
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be labored now, the comments of a leading Rule 10b-5 authority, Bromberg, 
are worth noting: 
Causation is much the trickiest of 10b-5 elements to evaluate, both 
in terms of what the law is (since so few cases have reached the 
stage of dealing with the questions), and in terms of what it should 
be (especially in open market cases, because of the complex of 
factors which may join in causing losses and the large number of 
persons who may be affected). To dispense with it entirely would 
expose issuers, insiders, and perhaps others to immense liabilities 
for relatively minor misconduct. To insist that it be strictly proved 
would immunize them from civil liability in most instances, regard-
less of how major their misconduct. Some middle ground needs to 
be found, perhaps differing from case to case.2 
The Relevant Cases to Date 
(a) There have been thus far some four cases which are sufficiently rele-
vant to the legality of management forecasts to call for analysis here. The most 
straightforward of them, and hence the best starting point, is Milberg v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). There, a stock-
holder of Western Pacific brought an action under Rule 10b-5 against Western 
Pacific, together with Dow Jones, as publisher of Barron's, on account of an 
article about Western Pacific which appeared in the May 19, 1969 issue of 
Barron's and contained the following: "Western Pacific got off to a slow start 
this year. . . . Net for the June quarter, however, is expected to show some 
improvement over the $1.7 million, or 84 cents per share, earned in the like 
three months of 1968." Earnings for the June quarter turned out to be only 
25 cents per share. 
The plaintiff purchased 65 shares of Western Pacific common on June 
12, 1969, at a cost of $35% per share. She made no claim of having read 
the article in question, but maintained that her purchase was influenced by 
the general market climate created by that article. Subsequent to her pur-
chase, the market price of the stock dropped considerably, and the plaintiff 
sought to recover for her market losses, claiming that Barron's, or Western 
Pacific if it had supplied the information in the statement, had acted with 
"careless, reckless, and wanton disregard as to truth or falsity." 
The specific issue at this stage of the proceedings arose out of plaintiff's 
efforts to bring the suit as a class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all persons who bought common stock of 
Western Pacific between May 19 and July 31, 1969. As such a class action, 
the amount of the potential recovery could be quite large (assuming, of 
course, there was any recovery at all), which would mean a contingent fee of 
sufficient potential to induce counsel to pursue the suit; an individual plaintiff 
would often not have enough at stake to justify the expense of such a liti-
gation. While of course a decision on whether to allow the suit to proceed 
as a class action is not the same as a decision on the merits, there is a close 
2 Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud (1967), p. 220. 
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relationship between the two, because one of the tests imposed by the courts 
for qualification as a class action under Rule 23 is whether the plaintiff can 
make a preliminary showing that there is a substantial possibility of success 
on the merits. Applying this test, the court found that the plaintiff had little 
chance of succeeding in this case and hence refused to permit a class action. 
The court's observations on the merits of the plaintiff's claim are illuminating: 
What plaintiff is apparently attempting to do by this action is estab-
lish a new rule of law to the effect that, when a financial publication 
prints an estimate of a company's earnings, the company must earn 
at least that amount or both the publication and the company will be 
held strictly liable for any loss in market value of the stock after the 
date when the estimate is printed. This would be a most unusual 
rule of law to say the least, but it is the only framework within which 
the plaintiff can claim a cause of action. 
It should be observed that the case is not squarely in point with regard 
to management forecasts since the court noted that Barron's did not purport 
to quote Western Pacific. (The court added that imposing liability on Western 
Pacific in such a case would mean that a corporation would have to read 
every article written about it to detect and disavow any inaccuracies.) But the 
court's comments with regard to Dow Jones would seem equally applicable 
to management forecasts made in good faith. After noting that no proof had 
been offered to show that Dow Jones deliberately or recklessly mistook the 
facts, the court added that "the estimate of earnings was no more than an 
estimate and could not reasonably have been expected to be infallible." The 
court characterized the plaintiff's effort as one of seeking "strict liability," 
that is, absolute liability for any error, which the court clearly seemed to 
regard as inappropriate. (The plaintiff's appeal from the denial of a class 
action was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the 
procedural ground that such an appeal will not lie unless a class action is 
essential to a continuation of the suit, and here the plaintiff's loss, together 
with that of her husband, the attorney in this case, was large enough to 
justify their continuing the action on their own.) 
(b) The major case to date on forecasts is Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 
F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), involving an action by stockholders of Monsanto 
Chemical, under various securities law provisions including Rule 10b-5, 
against the company and some of its directors and officers. The alleged 
ground for the suit was that, in order to sell some of their own holdings at 
higher prices, the individual defendants had manipulated the price of Mon-
santo stock by publishing false and misleading forecasts of earnings while 
concealing inside information that would have indicated a likely decline in 
earnings. The plaintiffs sought damages for the losses they suffered as a 
result of their purchases of Monsanto stock during the period of alleged arti-
ficially high prices. 
The facts relating to the forecasts require some detail. Monsanto's net 
sales and net income for the four-year period 1961-1964 had grown rapidly, 
and 1964 was a record year, with net sales of nearly $1.4 billion and net 
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earnings of approximately $115 million, or $3.72 per share. At the end of 
1964, in the normal course of its program of periodic presentations to, and 
interviews with, financial analysts and commentators, Monsanto projected 
that 1965 results would surpass 1964. At the end of each of the first three 
quarters of 1965, with record results being logged in each one, Monsanto 
projected increased sales and earnings for the year as a whole. During the 
fourth quarter of 1965, Monsanto experienced some temporary start-up diffi-
culties in plants using new processes, but despite these problems net sales 
and net income both set all-time highs in 1965, with sales rising to $1.5 
billion and net income to $123 million, or $3.89 per share. 
At the end of 1965 Monsanto anticipated that the operations in 1966 
would show an increase over 1965's record results. In the first half of 1966 
sales and income did continue to climb, setting new records for any six-
month period, and Monsanto continued to estimate that overall 1966 results 
would exceed those of 1965. However, during the second half of 1966 the 
chemical industry in general, and large synthetic fiber producers like Mon-
santo and Dupont in particular, were especially hard hit in a general business 
and stock market recession. Synthetic producers experienced a number of 
severe and unanticipated setbacks, such as the austerity program in Great 
Britain which curtailed consumer spending, sharp reductions in the prices of 
nylon and polyester, and a fall-off in the consumption of acrylic fibers in the 
United States caused by the lack of housing starts and tight money. 
As a result of these unanticipated difficulties, even though Monsanto's 
1966 sales were some 10 per cent higher than in 1965 its income for the year 
declined to just over $112 million. (At the same time Dupont, which also had 
expected its 1966 earnings to increase, suffered a decline in net income from 
operations during the third and fourth quarters of 1966, and its overall net 
income for 1966 was less than that of 1965.) 
During 1966 market prices of securities generally declined, with the Dow 
dropping more than 200 points from 955 on February 9 to 744 on October 7. 
The decline among the chemicals was even greater, and during the last half 
of 1966 the prices of Monsanto and Dupont stock declined more than those 
of the overall chemical industry. One of the plaintiffs (the only one whose 
own claimed loss was more than nominal) had bought 300 shares of Mon-
santo in April 1965, and sold them in October 1966, at a loss of more than 
$14,000. 
The primary issue before the court in this case, as in the Milberg case, 
was whether the plaintiffs had shown a sufficient possibility of prevailing on 
the merits to entitle them to bring the suit as a class action. However, the 
procedural setting was a good deal more complicated than in Milberg, and 
requires some explanation for a full appreciation of the significance of the 
decision. In a prior opinion (which incidentally tells you all you ever wanted to 
know about class actions in the securities field—and then some!), the court 
had decided that the plaintiffs' likelihood of success (and consequent right 
to a class action) should be determined by holding a preliminary hearing at 
which the plaintiffs would have to show (1) that there was a material dis-
crepancy between the defendants' predictions as to Monsanto's future pros-
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pects and what actually occurred, and (2) after submission of evidence by 
the defendants as to their transactions in Monsanto stock during the period 
in question and the internal corporate memoranda containing the information 
on which they relied in making their predictions, that there was a "suspicious" 
pattern of securities transactions by the defendants during the period in 
question, and that, on the basis of information before them, the estimates by 
the individual defendants were not reasonable. 43 F.R.D. 472 (1968). 
After a lengthy hearing, the trial court not only disallowed a class action 
but also entered a summary judgment on the merits for the defendants, based 
upon the finding that there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' charges. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should not have 
granted summary judgment on the merits for the defendants; in addition, 
apparently fearing that the class action issue might have been observed by 
the erroneous summary judgment decision, the Court of Appeals ordered a 
reconsideration of the class action question also. 438 F. 2d 825 (2d Cir. 
1970), 438 F. 2d 833 (1971). (On rehearing, the Court of Appeals softened 
its decision to a remand of the case to the trial court for the purpose of 
making express findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court 
had not done. 438 F. 2d 833 (1971).) 
It was in this rather complex procedural framework that the matter finally 
came on for decision in the instant case (and the procedural background has 
been set out in this almost dizzying detail because it does focus sharply 
the difference between allowing a class action and a decision on the merits, 
a distinction which is likely to continue to loom large in securities law litiga-
tions). The trial court reaffirmed its refusal to allow a class action, re-
iterating its finding that there was no substantial possibility of the plaintiffs 
succeeding on the merits, but also emphasizing its conclusion that the in-
dividual plaintiffs had enough at stake in the suit, particularly in the light of 
their claims for substantial punitive damages, to make it likely that the case 
would go forward even though it was not a class action. (The court expressly 
reserved judgment on whether its decision on the class action issue would 
have been the same if its conclusion had been different as to the amount 
at stake.) 
With regard to the forecasts, the court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' 
claim that the internal data of Monsanto did not justify the issuance of fore-
casts of substantial earnings gains during the 1964-66 period. Rather, the 
court held, the "information available to defendants as shown by the material 
submitted to the court and available through extensive discovery indicates 
that those forecasts were sound when made and that the subsequent failure 
of earnings to meet predictions was due to market and other changes that a 
reasonable businessman would not have foreseen or would have discounted 
in making predictions." 
In addition, the court commented favorably upon Monsanto's program 
of public disclosure, which included its annual and quarterly reports, periodic 
distribution of press releases containing information regarding Monsanto 
developments, and various presentations to, and interviews with, financial 
analysts, members of the press, and shareholders to report on the current 
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situation at Monsanto and to indicate prospects for the future. The court 
observed that the temporary plant start-up difficulties which Monsanto ex-
perienced in the fourth quarter of 1965 had been reported in public state-
ments which appeared in various financial news media. In addition, during 
the last quarter of 1966, when Monsanto, as well as the entire fiber industry, 
was experiencing severe and unanticipated set-backs, there were numerous 
public statements reporting these difficulties in the news media. The court 
concluded that Monsanto's program of public reporting was appropriately 
calculated to inform its stockholders, the financial community, and the public 
generally, in a fair, current, and timely manner, of the company's results, 
prospects, and current developments and problems, including any changes 
in prospects and problems, without disclosing confidential information that 
might have been of greater interest to competitors than investors. 
In connection with examining the correlation between the public pro-
jections by the individual defendants and the internal Monsanto information, 
the court undertook a lengthy analysis of the company's internal budgeting 
operations (which are worth reviewing because if they are not now common-
place they may well become so after having received judicial approval in 
this case). The basic internal documents consisted of "Corporate Long-
Range Plans," yearly "Budgets," quarterly "Budget Reviews," and so-called 
"Capital Appropriation Requests." The Corporate Long-Range Plan, which 
covered a period of five years and was revised annually, was the product of 
input from every level of the company, from the salesmen in the field all the 
way to the general managers of the various Monsanto divisions. In addition 
to this long-range plan, each year in the fall every division of Monsanto pre-
pared a budget for the next year, indicating among other operating data the 
budgeted sales and earnings for the division. These divisional budgets were 
extensively reviewed by budget committees at various levels, and then con-
solidated into an overall corporate budget which was presented to the Board 
of Directors for approval. This work involved the effort and judgment of many 
people in each division who assembled cost and price data: The marketing 
people estimated the number of pounds of each product which might be sold 
at various prices based on discussions with customers; the manufacturing 
people calculated the cost of manufacturing these products; accounting 
personnel assessed overhead, research and other charges. The quarterly 
"Budget Review" was regularly prepared at the end of the first and second 
quarters of each year and included forecasts of sales and earnings as of 
that time for the balance of the year. 
The court made an express finding that these internal records were 
appropriately prepared and extensively reviewed for the purpose of fairly and 
realistically reflecting Monsanto's results and the estimates of its future pros-
pects. The court also found that the Monsanto management insisted that 
these internal documents and estimates be as honest and accurate as 
possible, and that as a result these internal projections were reasonable and 
actually represented the best estimates of the future by the Monsanto people 
most qualified to make such estimates. 
The court then concluded with its ultimate findings that (1) all of the 
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statements and forecasts complained of by the plaintiffs were consistent with, 
and fairly and accurately reflected, the information in the internal documents; 
(2) the public statements and forecasts were intended to accomplish the 
proper objective of informing Monsanto's stockholders and the public of the 
results of operations and other matters of interest concerning Monsanto; and 
(3) Monsanto's results, prospects, developments, and problems were fairly 
and timely reported to its stockholders and to the public. (Of less relevance 
to us are the court's other two conclusions: First, that the sales of Monsanto 
stock by the individual defendants during the period in question were mostly 
for the purpose of raising funds with which to exercise Monsanto stock 
options, so that on balance the defendants were buyers during this period 
rather than sellers and second, that the transactions of the individual defend-
ants were undertaken in good faith, and based on the same information as 
had been made available to outsiders.) 
The opinion concludes with some rather sympathetic observations about 
the impact of lawsuits, especially class actions, on managements in cases 
like this. The court noted that if cases as doubtful as the instant one were 
allowed to continue as class actions, it would encourage and prolong such 
litigation, subjecting many corporate managers to the considerable financial 
burden of defending, which the court thought might prove particularly difficult 
for men who had risen recently in the corporate hierarchy and hence might 
have relatively limited financial resources. In addition, the court commented 
that, especially these days when corporate executives are encouraged to 
publish information and to open their doors to analysts, a rule of law that 
was too restrictive and inflexible (presumably meaning a rule that could give 
rise to liability merely because predictions do not come true) might tend to 
over-inhibit managers without providing any gain to investors in the form of 
more reliable predictions. The court added, apparently in response to a 
contention by the plaintiffs that the Monsanto management should have been 
more alert to the potential down-turn in the company's affairs in 1966, and 
in any event with evident admiration, that among the attributes of the success-
ful executive are his enthusiasm and his "conviction" that any business 
problem he may encounter can be solved. 
Having decided that the suit could not go forward as a class action, 
about a week later the trial court reinstated its grant of summary judgment 
on the merits to the defendants. Since the Court of Appeals had already 
indicated grave doubt about the propriety of this step, we may well not have 
heard the end of this case. 
It is worth pausing to consider some of the implications of the Dolgow 
decision (which, unlike Milberg, is unequivocably a management forecast 
case). First, note that the plaintiffs did not simply charge the defendants with 
making a forecast which turned out to be erroneous. (This was equally true 
in Milberg, where the plaintiffs alleged "careless, reckless, and wanton dis-
regard as to truth or falsity," but the court found no evidence of deliberate 
or reckless mistake, and made it clear that mere error in the forecast would 
not give rise to liability.) The plaintiffs' allegations were much more serious, 
that is, that the forecasts promulgated by the defendants were inconsistent 
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with the interna! data, and that the defendants were thereby seeking to 
feather their own nests. Of course a claim that corporate officers and di-
rectors were acting in their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of 
the corporation amounts to a charge akin to fraud under any standard. Of 
much greater interest to us in this inquiry is the claim that the published 
forecasts were inconsistent with the available internal evidence, since that 
would appear to spell out a classic case of misrepresentation in connection 
with an opinion. That is, the publication of the forecasts by the defendants 
carried with them the implied representation that the defendants actually 
held the opinions expressed and had a reasonable basis for those opinions, 
and one or the other of those representations, or perhaps both, would be 
false if the defendants were in possession of reliable data inconsistent with 
the forecasts made. 
Of course this question became moot in Dolgow with the court's finding 
that there was in fact no inconsistency between the published forecasts and 
the internal records (along with the finding that the defendants were not 
seeking to favor their private interests in the market, which was the only 
motive advanced by the plaintiffs for the alleged departure of the published 
forecasts from the internal data). But the court's painstaking comparison of 
the published forecasts with the in-house figures stands as a strong warning 
of the danger of departing from the internal data, which would have serious 
implications for any management preferring to use for publication figures 
more conservative than its interna! projections, either out of desire to pub-
licize a more readily reachable goal or because the internal budget figures 
themselves were more in the nature of a target than a realistic projection 
of future results. 
Also of some significance is the court's detailed analysis of the com-
pany's internal budgetary procedures, leading to the conclusion that the 
internal figures were the product of thoughtful and conscientious efforts by 
the people in the company best qualified to do this work. It would appear that 
the court thought it relevant to demonstrate the absence of negligence in 
preparing the internal data which formed the basis of the published forecasts, 
thus perhaps implying that there could indeed have been liability merely 
for negligence (for example, if the interna! work, in which most of the de-
fendants had presumably participated, had been careless or inadequate). 
However, we are left entirely to inference with regard to possible liability for 
negligence, since the opinion does not deal specifically with the issue, either 
in the foregoing context or in connection with the plaintiffs' claim, referred 
to in one of the earlier opinions in the case, that the defendants should have 
foreseen a decline in Monsanto's earnings for 1966 because of the expiration 
of certain license rights that year, which sounds like an express charge of 
negligence. 
(c) Less directly in point but still instructive is the case of Butler 
Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 
910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affirmed, 425 F. 2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). Butler Aviation 
sought a preliminary injunction against CDI's tender offer for Butler shares on 
the ground that CDI had artificially inflated the market price of its stock by 
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making misleading projections of future earnings and later misrepresenting 
past earnings. At CDI's annual meeting in September 1968, the president 
of the company had predicted (with what he claimed were "numerous 
hedges") earnings for the last quarter of fiscal 1969 (ending April 30, 1969) 
of nearly 20 cents per share and earnings for the year of about 60 cents per 
share. This prediction was repeated without any qualifications in a press 
release shortly thereafter and was somewhat reinforced by another press 
release in December 1968, which reported second-quarter earnings and said 
they bolstered the company's "confidence in previously projected improve-
ments" during the balance of the year. Earnings for fiscal 1969 actually 
turned out to be only 33 cents per share, compared with 52 cents for fiscal 
1968. In addition, earnings for the last quarter of fiscal 1969 would have 
been lower than those of the third quarter, but for a change in the method 
of accounting for year-end adjustments (allocating them among all four 
quarters instead of entirely to the last quarter, as in the past), which was 
adopted for the purpose of making sure that fourth-quarter earnings were 
at least a little higher than third-quarter earnings. Nevertheless, CDI's annual 
report referred to an improvement in earnings for the fourth quarter over the 
third quarter, without any disclosure of the change in accounting practice. 
The trial court allowed the preliminary injunction because of the great 
likelihood that the plaintiff would ultimately succeed in establishing mis-
representations under Rule 10b-5 [as well as section 14(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, regulating tender offers] in connection with the unqualified 
earnings projection for fiscal 1969, and the bald statement that fourth-quarter 
earnings for fiscal 1969 had exceeded those of the third quarter. In affirming, 
the Court of Appeals agreed that CDI deserved censure but was more doubt-
ful as to the effect of these "delinquencies" on the exchange offer for Butler 
stock, since that did not come until November 1969 and was pursuant to a 
full prospectus on file with the SEC which was not alleged to contain any 
misrepresentations. The Court of Appeals noted that the price of CDI stock 
had actually fallen from $18 at the time of earnings projections in September 
1968 to $15 in November, although it then rose steadily to $35 in May 1969. 
Moreover, the Court thought that all of the forecast damage would have been 
dissipated by the issuance of the Annual Report for fiscal 1969 on August 20, 
showing the actual earnings of only 33 cents per share for the year. The 
Court was more troubled by the statement about improved fourth-quarter 
earnings, but noted that this had not been repeated in the tender offer pros-
pectus. However, the Court of Appeals decided that a company intent on 
an acquisition program should be especially careful to guard against mis-
statements and so, with some reluctance, affirmed the trial court's decision. 
This case is clearly not primarily concerned with inaccurate forecasts, 
in view of the presence of the factual misrepresentation as to fourth-quarter 
results, which alone would have justified the decision. But the case is cer-
tainly not inconsistent with the notion advanced herein that a management 
forecast is not a warranty of the future, although to be sure the court never 
says this expressly. There was sufficient reason to condemn the forecast 
in this case that it was allowed to be disseminated without the qualifications 
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the president concededly thought were called for, with the result that the 
forecast implied greater assurance than the forecaster actually felt (to say 
nothing of whether the forecast had been prepared with reasonable care, 
as to which the court had no occasion to comment at this preliminary stage 
in the proceedings). A forecast in unqualified terms here, in other words, was 
a misrepresentation of the actual state of mind of the person making the 
forecast, and that does amount, as we have seen, to a misrepresentation of 
fact. 
(d) The last of the cases worth noting is Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil 
Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which involves a suit under Rule 10b-5 
and the common law against three directors of a company, its accountants, 
and its public relations firm for losses allegedly suffered in buying (or failing 
to sell) stock of the company in reliance upon projections made in a speech 
in February 1965 before the New York Society of Security Analysts. The 
speech, made by two of the directors, "with the consent and approval" of 
the third, estimated that the company's total income for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1965, would exceed $10,000,000, cash flow would approximate 
$6,000,000, and net income would be $3,500,000, or about double the income 
for the first six months of the year (subject to some reduction in case of 
acquisitions). The figures upon which these predictions were based had been 
prepared by the accountants; the public relations firm was employed by the 
company to distribute copies of the speech to shareholders and others. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the purpose of the speech and its distribution was to 
induce dealers to promote the sale of the stock, and to induce stockholders 
and others to retain or purchase shares. Plaintiffs charged that defendants 
"knowingly and intentionally, with intent to deceive," had failed to disclose 
in the speech that the accountants had underestimated the provision for 
depletion and depreciation for the first six months of fiscal 1965. Accordingly, 
the company's 1965 results were much lower than had been predicted, and 
the publication in late April 1965 of the nine-month's report showing the 
actual figures precipitated a drop in the market price of the stock. 
The decision itself in Sprayregen deals only with procedural matters, 
its principal holding being that stating a case under Rule 10b-5 does not 
require an allegation that the defendants made the misleading statements in 
order to enhance their own positions in the securities market; it is enough 
that the statements might cause reasonable investors to rely and thereby 
purchase or sell securities. (The court was not sure that merely holding on 
to shares satisfied the apparent requirement of Rule 10b-5 that there be a 
purchase or sale but found that the plaintiffs' alternative claim of having pur-
chased stock was sufficient to clear this hurdle.) The court also held that 
the director who did not actually participate in the speech was as subject to 
liability under Rule 10b-5 as those who did if it was shown that he consented 
to and approved of their actions. 
On the merits of forecasting, the case is useful only as an example of 
the close relationship between projections of the future and the financial 
statements for the past (which necessarily include their own "estimation" 
component, such as here for depreciation and depletion). The case affords 
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no guidance as to negligence, since it was alleged that the defendants had 
acted "knowingly and intentionally." 
Subjects for Further Reflection 
First, a brief comment about the relatively small number of cases in-
volving attacks on forecasts thus far. While this could mean that forecasts 
are not quite as inviting a target as suggested earlier, my own guess is that 
the paucity of cases is due to the fact that wide-scale forecasting is still a 
relatively recent phenomenon. For obvious reasons, litigation often lags 
the state of the art by several years; and, the fact that cases are already 
pending in connection with the forecasts for Bausch & Lomb and Wrigley, 
two of the better-known recent subjects of forecasts, may be a more accurate 
harbinger of things to come. The legion of cases involving over-optimistic 
predictions by brokers or other salesmen to potential buyers about the future 
of a stock, oftentimes interspersed with observations about future sales, net 
income, and the like, are not particularly relevant for our purposes. These 
cases have almost always included not only some specific factual misrepre-
sentations, but also a lack of any sufficient basis for the predictions made 
(a lack which should not often characterize a management forecast); in 
addition, the broker cases also present the issue of justifiable "puffing" of 
goods offered for sale, see e.g., Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 
1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a defense to which the courts have displayed increasing 
hostility in the securities field of late, [see Loss, Securities Regulation, Vol. 
VI (1969 Supp.) 3541] but which would in any event scarcely be permissible 
in connection with management forecasts designed to inform and advise the 
investing community. 
Second, reference has already been made to the fact that at the present 
time the SEC does not permit the inclusion of forecasts in registration 
material or in connection with proxy solicitations. The given reason, often 
expressed in SEC opinions, is that forecasts, particularly when reduced to 
specific dollar figures, give a false appearance of precision which makes 
them inherently misleading. (See, for example, Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 SEC, 
60, 1939.) Similarly, the SEC's Proxy Rule 14a-9, prohibiting false or mis-
leading statements in proxy solicitations, gives as its first example of what 
may be misleading: "Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings 
or dividends." This rule was the subject of the following comment in Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 
408-409 (N.D. III. 1964), enjoining a shareholder vote on a choice between 
competing merger offers because of violations of the proxy rules: 
There is good reason for this emphasis on prediction. Bald 
statements contrary to concrete and historical fact run the risk of 
ready refutation and exposure, and to that degree are self-policing. 
Predictions, estimates, and opinions are more elusive and may 
present graver dangers of misleading the investing public. They 
lend themselves to this evil by allowing facts to be suggested or 
implied without direct statement. Even if they do not tend to induce 
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belief in any particular fact, they nonetheless import the existence 
of unspecified facts which support the conclusion. The share-
holder may be led readily to assume, contrary to fact that the pre-
dictor has special knowledge or unique information to bear out 
fully his prediction, and be induced to rely upon a supposed expert 
judgment of the mysteries of finance. "Since an expert can speak 
with authority only as to subjects upon which he has professional 
knowledge and since no engineering course or other professional 
training has ever been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, 
attempts by companies to predict future earnings on their own or 
on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the 
Commission to be misleading because they suggest to the investor 
a competence and authority which in fact does not exist." Heller, 
"Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulations," 
XVI, The Business Lawyer, 300, 307 (1961). Whether the prediction 
is the product of an intent to mislead or of innocent overenthusiasm, 
the misleading effect upon the investing public is the same. 
If these characterizations of forecasts were to be taken literally, then 
any forecast would seem to fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 10b-5 
against misleading statements, which in turn could lead to virtually absolute 
liability for any loss resulting from a forecast that proved inaccurate. On the 
other hand, it does not appear that such a theory has ever been advanced 
by the SEC or anyone else, and perhaps the basis for it will soon evaporate, 
in view of the SEC's current intensive reexamination of its position and Chair-
man Casey's recent speeches indicating a favorable disposition toward per-
mitting the inclusion of forecasts in material filed with the Commission.3 
At the opposite end of the Rule 10b-5 spectrum is the question of 
whether the Rule could be construed to impose an affirmative obligation on 
companies to publicly disclose their internal forecasting data. It was, after 
all, in imposing on corporate insiders the duty to disclose their special in-
formation when purchasing the company's stock that Rule 10b-5 first made 
its mark, before it became the general policeman of all misrepresentations. 
And of late there have been a number of developments in the direction of 
extending the disclosure obligation well beyond the case of insiders dealing 
with the company's stockholders, making it applicable to all information 
that would be relevant to the investing community at large—in other words, 
a kind of generalized obligation to the integrity of the securities markets. 
For example, the New York Stock Exchange's disclosure policy calls for a 
corporation "to release quickly to the public any news or information which 
might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for securities."4 
To much the same effect is the now classic decision in this field, SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), and under Judge 
Friendly's definition of "materiality"—any information which would prompt a 
3 See footnote 1. 
4 New York Stock Exchange, "Company Manual A-18" (1968). 
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reasonable man to make an investment decision—there seems little doubt 
that a company's internal forecasting data could qualify.5 
Of course, the primary objective of disclosure requirements is still to 
prevent unfair advantage to insiders, tippees, and the like (which incidentally 
means that unpublished internal forecasts not only must not be used by 
insiders but also must not be made available to a favored few stockholders 
or potential investors),6 hence a showing that no such people were trading 
with knowledge of the undisclosed information would make the risk of liability 
under Rule 10b-5 for failure to publicize more theoretical than real. But 
this would provide little comfort in the case of internal projections, if they 
were found to be subject to the disclosure obligation, since they exist con-
tinuously, subject to constant review and revision, and the result would be to 
permanently bar insiders from trading in their company's stock. And this 
result would not be altered even if it could be shown that the decision not to 
disclose internal projections had been made to further the best interests of 
the company, because of the possible benefits to competitors from publica-
tion; such a contention might be accepted, as was the alleged business need 
to acquire adjoining lands in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, but at the cost of 
excluding insiders from the market until the information was disclosed, which 
in the case of internal forecasts would mean permanently. 
Professor Bromberg, in the article cited in note 5, contends that pro-
jections do indeed fall within the disclosure obligation, at least where they 
are for the short-term future and there is reasonable basis for confidence 
in them on the basis of previous experience or otherwise. Even so, he sug-
gests that, except when current projections indicate a very significant varia-
tion from past performance, the risk of withholding projections may be less 
than the risk that releasing them will result in suit by investors who place 
undue reliance on them. (Perhaps this quite legitimate concern should in-
stead be advanced against finding any obligation to disclose forecasts in 
the first place.) 
Would there be any impact on this question of a possible disclosure 
obligation if the SEC reversed its stand and decided to allow forecasting in 
registration and proxy material? In theory perhaps not, since the present 
SEC strictures do not constitute a legal justification for failing to disclose (if 
any duty to do so were found) in contexts other than registration and proxy 
solicitation. But in practice this could help to support a disclosure obligation 
since it would at least eliminate the awkwardness of insisting upon disclosure 
of information that the SEC would not permit to be included for its purposes. 
Not that such inconsistencies have bothered the SEC much; in Gerstle v. 
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. N.Y. 1969), the SEC contended 
that the estimated liquidating values of certain of a company's assets likely 
to be sold off should have been disclosed in the textual material (though 
not in the financial statements) in a proxy solicitation for approval of a merger, 
5 See, generally, Bromberg, "Disclosure Programs for Publicly Held Companies— 
A Practical Guide," Duke Law Journal (1970), p. 1139. 
6 SEC Litigation Release No. 4080, August 8, 1968. 
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although the SEC staff had rejected a suggestion that such information be 
included at the time of the filing of the proxy material with the Commission. 
If a company does undertake to publish forecasts, whether voluntarily 
or pursuant to a disclosure obligation, it may then have the duty to con-
tinuously review the data and publish periodic revisions if called for. Just 
how often such revisions should be made is far from clear, but probably on 
some regular basis, plus immediately upon any significant and unexpected 
development (which of course might require disclosure even if the company 
were not publishing forecasts). Such an additional responsibility would create 
another level of potential claims for damages, quite independent of the merits 
of the forecasts actually made, and might well constitute a further objection 
from management's point of view to publishing forecasts in the first place. 
Compare Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 93,004 (D. Colo. 1971) (defendants who had issued 
optimistic earnings reports were obligated to publicize deterioration in the 
company's condition). 
Appendix 
British Forecasting Practice 
Because so much of our literature on forecasting makes reference to the 
British practice, it may be useful to summarize just what that is. In Great 
Britain there are three primary sources of so-called "profit forecasts": 
1. In take-over bid circulars and merger proposals. 
2. In the prospectuses issued in conjunction with an offering of securities. 
3. In annual reports, Chairmen's statements, and the like. 
Since most of the notoriety about the British experience relates to take-
over bids, we might look there first. The starting point is the City Code on 
Take-overs and Mergers, a voluntary system of self-regulation adopted by 
representatives of leading institutions of the City of London as a guide to 
good business practices in the conduct of take-overs and mergers. While 
the City Code does not have the force of statute law, it is very influential as 
a practical matter because breach of its provisions could result in public 
censure, or, in an extreme case, delisting of a company's securities from 
an exchange. The Code has been revised twice since its adoption in 1968, 
and in the latest version (the third edition of the Code), Rule 16 dealing with 
profit forecasts (Rule 15 in prior editions) provides as follows: 
Without in any way detracting from the imperative necessity of 
maintaining the highest standards of accuracy and fair presentation 
in all communications to shareholders in a take-over or merger 
transaction, attention is particularly drawn in this connection to profit 
forecasts . . . . Notwithstanding the obvious hazard attached to the 
forecasting or profits, any profit forecasts must be compiled with the 
greatest possible care by the directors, whose whole responsibilities 
they are. When profit forecasts appear in any document addressed 
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to shareholders in connection with an offer, the assumptions, in-
cluding the commercial assumptions, upon which the directors 
have based their profit forecasts, must be stated in the document. 
The accounting bases and calculations for the forecasts must be 
examined and reported on by the auditors or consultant account-
ants. Any financial adviser mentioned in the document must also 
report on the forecasts. The accountants' report and, if there is an 
adviser, his report, must be contained in such document and be 
accompanied by a statement that the accountants, and, where 
relevant, the adviser, have given and not withdrawn their consent 
to publication. Wherever profit forecasts appear in relation to a 
period in which trading has already commenced, the latest un-
audited profit figures which are available in respect of the expired 
portion of that trading period together with comparable figures for 
the preceding year must be stated. Alternatively, if no figures are 
available, that fact must be stated. 
The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, which administers and enforces 
the City Code, has issued interpretations, called "Practice Notes," in con-
nection with this Rule. Practice Note No. 4 (revised edition, February 16, 
1972) deals with the question of what constitutes a profit forecast for the 
purpose of the Rule, in the following terms: 
It is impossible to generalize but broadly whenever a form of 
words puts a floor under (or, in certain circumstances, a ceiling on) 
the likely profits of a particular period or whenever a form of words 
contains the data necessary to ascertain an approximate figure 
for future profits by an arithmetical process, the Panel takes the 
view that there is a profit forecast. . . . 
Practice Note No. 6 (revised edition, February 16, 1972) is a good deal 
more extensive, dealing with the assumptions on which a forecast is based. 
The Practice Note calls for listing the assumptions, together with information 
that would help shareholders reach their own decision as to the reasonable-
ness and reliability of the forecast, and then adds, "This should include a 
summary of the conclusions reached by the directors on matters which 
required judgment as to the likely outcome of events, and should draw the 
shareholders' attention to, and where possible quantify, those uncertain 
factors which could materially disturb the ultimate achievement of the fore-
cast." Practice Note No. 6 goes on to suggest that some indication be in-
cluded as to how the profit forecast would be affected if certain of the major 
assumptions prove to be ill-founded: "For example, the effect might be shown 
if sales volume, selling prices, raw material costs, etc., were Y% above/below 
estimate, or if full production from a new factory were delayed by Z months. 
It may be appropriate for maximum and minimum forecast profits to be given 
rather than a single figure." 
While profit forecasts are not required by the City Code, they are very 
likely used in take-over situations, on behalf of both the offeree company 
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and the offeror. Since May 1, 1969, the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 
has been actively policing profit forecasts in these situations by keeping 
records of the forecasts made and comparing them with the actual results. 
In its Report for the year ending March 31, 1972, the Panel stated that of 
the 210 cases of forecasting which had been checked, 170 had proved to be 
accurate within 10 percent. The Panel undertook to investigate the 40 cases 
in which the forecasts had not been that accurate, and of the 19 cases where 
the investigation had been completed there were only 3 where there was no 
satisfactory explanation (such as unforeseeable developments, reflecting no 
discredit on those who had been responsible for making or reporting on the 
forecasts). 
With regard to the role of accountants and other advisers in profit 
forecasts, the original version of Rule 16 (Rule 15 at that time) required that 
"the calculations and the bases for the forecasts must be examined and 
reported on by the auditors or consultant accountants." However, the report 
by the accountants was to go only to the directors; it was not expected that 
their report would be made public (except perhaps if it took strenuous issue 
with the forecast made), and the Council of the Institute of Chartered Account-
ants promulgated guidelines on the proper role of accountants, stressing 
that "the name of the reporting accountants is not to be directly associated 
with the profit forecasts."7 In the 1969 revision of the City Code, Rule 16 
was amended to change the subject of the accountants' examination and 
report into its present, narrower form: "the accounting bases and calculations 
for the forecasts." (Emphasis supplied.) In this same revision the account-
ants' report was required to be made public as part of the document 
addressed to stockholders concerning a take-over offer and containing the 
forecast; but, perhaps as a corollary, language was added making clear that 
the forecasts were the "sole responsibility" of the directors (subsequently 
changed to the present awkward phrase, "whose whole responsibilities they 
are," in the third edition of the City Code). 
The role of the "financial adviser" under Rule 16 has had a somewhat 
similar history. The original version of the Rule required that "the forecasts 
and the assumptions on which they rest must be corroborated, as far as 
possible, and reported on by the company's merchant bank or other ad-
visers." In the 1969 revision this was softened to require only that "any 
Merchant Bank or other adviser maintained in the document must also report 
on the forecasts," but any such report had to be included in the document to 
the stockholders; and in the third edition of the Code the phrase "any Mer-
chant Bank or other adviser" was collapsed into the present simple "any 
financial adviser." 
Incidentally, it might be noted that the April 1969 revision of Rule 16 to 
require that the reports of the accountants and financial adviser be made 
public by way of inclusion in the document to stockholders coincides with 
the date when the Pane! on Take-overs and Mergers launched its program of 
7 See Statement by the Council of ICA, "Accountants' Reports on Profit Forecasts," 
The Accountant (July 27, 1968), pp. 123, 125. 
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carefully checking the record of forecasts against the actual events. The 
Director-General of the Panel in a 1971 article strongly implied that this 
"requirement for accountant and merchant bankers to stick their names on 
to the profit forecasts on a take-over bid" may have been responsible for the 
fact that in the "two years plan of policing, we have in fact been rather 
pleased with the results," whereas before this policing of forecasts began in 
1969 "the record was poor."8 
The other major occasion for dissemination of a profit forecast in England 
is the issuance of a prospectus in connection with a public offering of securi-
ties (the very situation, it may be recalled, where forecasts are least likely to 
appear under our practice, because of the SEC's current refusal to permit 
their inclusion). Although in theory such prospectuses are subject to the 
basic English corporation legislation, the Companies Act of 1948, in practice 
they are governed by the self-regulation of the Federation of Stock Ex-
changes, because the Companies Act exempts offerings made through a 
member of the stock exchange in compliance with the rules of the exchange 
(and since there is virtually no over-the-counter market in England, most 
offerings are made pursuant to the exchange requirements). The Rules of 
the Federation of Stock Exchanges relating to "Admission of Securities to 
Quotations" (which appear in a book with a canary-yellow cover, sometimes 
referred to as the "Yellow Peril") contains a section entitled "Contents of a 
Prospectus" (Schedule II, Part A), which requires "a statement as to the 
financial and trading prospects of the Company." Though this is hardly a 
clear-cut requirement of profit forecasts, the general practice in England, 
according to a 1972 article by John Grieves, a London solicitor (publication 
whereabouts unknown), is for the prospectus to contain forecasts with re-
gard to the profits of the financial year in which the prospectus is issued 
(commonly accompanied by a statement as to the dividend expected to be 
recommended). A typical form of language as to expected profits might be 
as follows: "The Directors expected that, in the absence of unforeseen cir-
cumstances, the pre-tax profits of the Company for the financial year ending 
30th June 1972 will not be less than £350,000." 
It should be noted here that profit forecasts in prospectuses are cus-
tomarily quite conservative, and it is unusual for these forecasts not to be 
met. According to the Director-General of the Panel on Take-over and 
Mergers, in the article cited above, the reason for this is that a company 
will get a much better market rating over the long run if its original market 
flotation was done on a somewhat conservative basis, whereas "no harm is 
done to the old shareholders if the forecast is exceeded, even by a large 
amount [since their] benefit accrues in the enhanced market value of the 
shares which they have retained." He contrasts this with take-overs, where 
"both the attack and the defense tend to overestimate," but where, con-
versely, undue conservatism could do a real disservice to a company's own 
8 Fraser, "Account ing and the Merger Movement," The Accountant (September 9, 
1971), pp. 353, 355. 
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stockholders in terms of reflecting the real values they would be contributing 
to the proposed combination. 
Finally, as to profit forecasts in annual reports and the like, directors 
are not normally anxious to commit themselves to an estimate of the profit 
or loss for the current year, and hence do not do so unless there is some 
special occasion for it. And when forecasts are included in the annual 
report, according to Grieves, in the article noted earlier, they are "custom-
arily couched in vague and general terms and hedged with broad qualifi-
cations"; hence, he concludes that forecasts in annual reports do not have 
the significance of forecasts in prospectuses or take-over bids. 
Turning now to the question of possible liability for mistaken forecasts, 
as to take-over bids, it has already been noted that the City Code does not 
have the force of law; hence the language of Rule 16 calling for the com-
pilation of profit forecasts "with the greatest possible care by the directors, 
whose whole responsibilities they are" must be regarded as principally horta-
tory in nature (subject to the extra-legal sanctions referred to above). There-
fore, any liability on the directors in these circumstances would have to be 
predicated either on particular statutory provisions or general legal prin-
ciples. Great Britain has no Rule 10b-5, but it does have a Prevention of 
Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, which, in section 13, provides that "any 
person who, by any . . . forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or 
deceptive, . . . or by the reckless making (dishonestly or otherwise) of any 
. . . forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive" induces or attempts to 
induce another person to buy or sell securities shall be guilty of a crime. 
Obviously, a knowing or reckless exaggeration of estimated profits, as might 
occur in a take-over bid (or in a prospectus for that matter, although, as 
noted, under current practice, that is far less likely), would run afoul of this 
statute as to whether an action for damages would lie, that would depend on 
whether the English courts find that this statute gives rise to implied civil 
liability for violations (the theory on which civil actions are brought under 
Rule 10b-5 in this country). 
What about liability for negligent error in a forecast? There may be more 
risk of such liability for a forecast in a prospectus than in other situations, 
because of section 43 of the Companies Act, which imposes civil liability for 
misstatements in a prospectus unless the defendants had reasonable ground 
to believe the statement was true, an approach quite reminiscent of our 
section 11 of the Securities Act. Apart from that provision, liability for negli-
gence would have to be based upon common-law principles. Grieves sug-
gests that, whatever might be the case with stockholders who act pursuant 
to a prospectus or a take-over bid, "it is unlikely that a person who pur-
chased securities in the market in the ordinary way, on the strength of a 
profit forecast made by a company, would have any remedy." This sounds 
like an application of the privity doctrine, which may still have force in 
England although it seems to be evaporating here. In any event, Grieves 
notes that "civil actions based upon profit forecasts not being met have been 
conspicuous by their absence." But this probably says more about the still 
rudimentary state of stockholder's suits in England than it does about liability 
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for forecasts. There are several differences between the English practice 
and ours that account for the lag in the development of stockholder's suits 
there: particularly, (1) the fact that contingent fees, which have proved such 
a strong inducement to shareholder's suits here, are shunned by English 
lawyers; and (2) that under the English approach an unsuccessful plaintiff 
might be required to pay the defendants' legal expenses, rather than merely 
costs as is the custom here. Obviously, therefore, as a practical matter the 
English forecasting practice was able to be developed with a good deal less 
concern about liability than would be true here, especially today. 
As to possible accountants' liability in connection with forecasts, that 
depends, as it would in this country also, on just what role the accountants 
play. In take-over bids, Rule 16 of the City Code makes the forecast and the 
underlying assumption the responsibility of the directors; while accountants 
are required to report on the "accounting bases and calculations," it is 
assumed that they do not have any responsibility for the figures. The State-
ment of Guidance of the Council of the ICA, "Accountants' Report on Profit 
Forecasts" (The Accountant, May, 1969) seeks to confirm this, noting that 
profit forecasts are not capable of confirmation and verification by reporting 
accountants in the same way as financial statements for past periods, and 
that there is no question of their being "audited." The Statement of Guidance 
continues as follows: 
It is important that reporting accountants . . . in the wording of their 
report . . . should take care to avoid giving any impression that they 
are in any way confirming, underwriting, guaranteeing, or otherwise 
accepting responsibility for the ultimate accuracy and realization of 
forecasts. . . . Reporting accountants can however, within limits 
[discussed in the Statement], properly undertake a critical and ob-
jective review of the accounting bases and calculations for profit 
forecasts, and can verify that the forecasts have been properly com-
puted from the underlying assumptions and data and are presented 
on a consistent basis. 
Presumably, if accountants were negligent in their discharge of this function, 
they could be liable to stockholders who had acted on the tender offer to 
their loss (since the stockholder recipients of the tender offer would seem to 
be squarely within the group whose reliance on the accountants' report was 
clearly foreseeable). 
In addition, Practice Note No. 6, "The Assumptions on Which a Profit 
Forecast is Based" (one of the memoranda "of interpretation and practice" 
under Rule 16 of the City Code, promulgated by the Panel on Take-overs 
and Mergers) observes that accountants and financial advisers have sub-
stantial influence on the information given about assumptions, and adds, 
"Neither should allow an assumption to be published which appears to them 
unrealistic (or one to be omitted which appears to them to be important) 
without commenting on it in their reports." However, the nature of the re-
sponsibility imposed by this statement seems somewhat more removed from 
the normal accounting function than, say, "accounting bases and calcula-
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tions," and to that extent liability for negligence in discharging this responsi-
bility might well be less likely. 
It may be worth noting that in investigating cases of badly missed fore-
casts the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers asks the company's accountants 
and other financial advisers for a formal written explanation of how the fore-
casts went so wrong. A novel feature of such inquires, by the way, is that 
the Panel has itself employed leading firms of chartered accountants to act 
as consultants in considering the explanations given. 
Turning to forecasts in prospectuses, it does not appear that accountants 
play any part in the process. The Stock Exchange rules governing the con-
tents of a prospectus, which deal extensively with the required report by the 
auditors with respect to the company's profit or losses for the previous ten 
years, its assets and liabilities, and "such other matters which appear to the 
auditors to be relevant," do not seem to call for any comment on profit fore-
casts. Nevertheless, according to an article by Metz in the New York Times 
on February 24, 1972, on the English practice, accountants are unwilling to 
put their names on a document if the projection is out of line. 
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